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LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY-
THE BRANDEIS THEORY
T HE life-span of Louis Brandeis covers a modern revolu-
tion in legal thinking. When he was born, in 1856, law
was taught by textbook and apprentice methods. Taney had
not yet delivered the Dred Scott decision. Story, a decade
earlier, had been able to continue his teaching at Harvard
between trips to Washington to take part in sessions of the
United States Supreme Court. The recognized authorities
were Blackstone and Kent. Law was said to be declaratory
of right, and the function of the judges was to apply the law
found in statutes and previous decisions. Before Mr. Justice
Brandeis died, in 1941, Harvard Law School graduates,
trained in case analysis, had become leaders in legal criticism
and experimentation. The United States Supreme Court had
survived grave challenges to its authority. Law had become,
largely through the Brandeis influence, what one of his biog-
raphers has described as "essentially an instrument of social
policy." '
It was seventy years ago that Louis Brandeis graduated
from Harvard Law School, with the reputation of having re-
ceived the highest marks ever given there. He had barely
turned twenty-one, but he had already had a taste of the then
fashionable German education and had found it wanting.
The intellectual climate at Harvard was for him more stim-
ulating. C. C. Langdell, on becoming Dean six years before
Brandeis entered, had introduced the case method of teach-
MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE 230 (1933); see LERNER,
M . JusTIcE BRANDEIS 35 (Frankfurter ed. 1932) and HAMILTON, id. at 182.
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ing and started a controversy in legal education which
carried over well into the twentieth century. Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., trained under the old faculty, had preceded
James Bradley Thayer in lecturing on constitutional law in
the new; was editing the American Law Review and the
twelfth edition of Kent's Com'mentaries; and was spending
his leisure moments in "twisting the tail of the cosmos" with
William James.2 In 1881 he was to deliver and publish a
series of Lowell Lectures under the title of The Gommu Law,
which was to become one of the classics of jurisprudence.
Roscoe Pound became a student in the Law School in 1889.
Brandeis, enjoying thoroughly the friendly rivalry of such
intellectual giants, not only developed a successful practice
in corporation law during the decade following his gradua-
tion in 1877-8, but he also showed his appreciation of what
Harvard Law School had done for him by founding the Har-
vard Law Association in 1886, 8 designed to expand the school
from a local law school to a national institution, and by help-
ing to inaugurate the Harvard Law Review in 1887, as the
first of that long line of distinguished law school reviews
which have been so very influential in advancing criticism
and scholarship in American law. By 1891, Brandeis' repu-
tation for high legal attainments was so well established in
Boston that he was invited to give a course in Business Law
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
In 1891 the industrial revolution, which had been grow-
ing all through the nineteenth century, reached a crisis in
America, culminating in the Homestead Strike at the Pitts-
burg steel mills. The impact of the great Dock Strike in
England two years earlier, in which Cardinal Manning had
undertaken to intervene; 4 the challenge presented by the
organization of the Knights of Labor in this country, and
Cardinal Gibbons' defense of their right to organize, when
he was in Rome to receive the red hat and to consult regard-
ing the founding of The Catholic University of America; 5
and the issuance of the great Encyclical Letters of Pope
2 BENT, JUSTICE OLIVm WENDELL HOLMES 57 (1932).
a BR.NmEIs, BUSINESS-A PROFESSION xii (new ed. 1933).
4 KENT, 9 CATHOLIC ENCYC. 608, and bibliography (1910).
5 GiBaoNs, I A RETROSPECT oF FIFTY YEARS 186-209 (1916).
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Leo XIII, including that "On the Condition of the Working
Classes" in 1891, indicate the depths to which the Christian
world was moved in its regard for human personality and
justice. Harvard, too, recognizing that strong forces were
at work which demanded attention, read the Encyclicals 6
but was not convinced Pope Leo's proposals would avail. To
what extent Louis Brandeis was informed of the Papal pro-
gram at that time is not known, although after he became a
Suprime Court judge in Washington, he is said to have spent
many a Thanksgiving Day discussing the principles of the
Encyclicals with Monsignor John A. Ryan of the Catholic
University Faculty.7
Rivalling the Church's program in attracting attention
in intellectual circles were the claims of socialism. The suc-
cessive convulsions in Europe, especially in France and Italy,
though remote, could not be entirely ignored politically or
culturally in this country, but the literature growing out of
or giving rise to them was written in foreign tongues. Not
so the works of the Fabians in England. Eventually H1. G.
Wells, George Bernard Shaw, and the Webbs became topics
of daring parlor conversation in the wealthiest homes. Louis
Brandeis was one of the first of the Harvard intellectuals to
investigate their claims. 8 Their conclusions about state own-
ership of property as a substitute for private ownership never
won his adherence, but the reasonableness of their methods
stimulated him to undertake investigations of his own.
Saddened by the bloodshed at Pittsburg, resulting from
efforts of human beings to overcome at any cost, oppression
and injustice in the economic sphere, he put aside all pre-
conceptions based upon his capitalistic environment, and
inaugurated a new technique of fact-finding in connection
with the administration of justice, which not only caused
him to rewrite his M.I.T. lectures in 1895, but which eventu-
6 PEABODY, JESUS CHRIST AND THE SocmIL QUESTioN 45-6 (1904) ; RoYcz,
Pope Leo's Philosophical Movement and Its Relation to Modern Thought,
FUGITIVE ESSAYS 408-429 (1920).7 DIL.wz. , MR. JusncE BLANnms, GREAT AMERICAN 98 (1941), citing
87 CONG. REc. 3040 (1941).
8 LIE, BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HIsToRY OF AN AimRICAN IDEAL 85(1936).
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ally was to bring him fame as the originator of a novel type
of legal brief, first introduced into the United States Supreme
Court in the Minimum Wage Case 9 and known as the
"Brandeis Brief."
"I think it was the affair at Homestead," he once wrote, "which first
set me thinking seriously about the labor problem. It took the shock
of that battle, where organized capital hired a private army to shoot
at organized labor for resisting an arbitrary cut in wages, to turn my
mind definitely toward a searching study of the relations-of labor to
industry .... I saw at once that the common law, built up under
simpler conditions of living, gave an inadequate basis for the adjust-
ment of the complex relations of the modern factory system. I threw
away my notes and approached my theme from new angles. Those
talks at Tech marked an epoch in my own career." 10
Unlike the eighteenth century, which had given rise to
legal arguments against tyranny, culminating only as a last
resort in recourse to arms in the American Revolution,"
the nineteenth had been marked by excessive reliance on
force and the claims of absolutism. In jurisprudence,
Bentham had thought of law as an instrument of force by
which planned reforms were to be effectuated. In philosophy,
the dichotomy between speculation and practice attempted
by Kant, and the concentration on abstractions proposed by
Hegel, had drawn increasing numbers of America's ablest
thinkers away from the realism of their legal foundations.
Through the writings of John Stuart Mill and Herbert
Spencer, an altruistic interest in social reform became fash-
ionable, but because of the idealistic turn given to what had
become for the most part a materialistic foundation, the in-
terest of the intellectuals in "the greatest good of the greatest
number" was largely speculative and unrealistic. The law,
functioning most successfully for prosperous litigants, while
continuing to protest its devotion to the cause of justice, had
tended to equate order not with justice but with the status
quo, and to lend its support to the coercion of the rebellious.
9 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 52 L. ed. 551 (1908).1o L. D. B. to L. S. Richard, THE INDEPENDENT 130 (July 27, 1914), quoted
in MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE 26 (1933); see also LiEF,
BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 85 (1936).
21 MCILwAIN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1923).
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Louis Brandeis, surrounded by such an intellectual cli-
mate, nevertheless refused to be drawn away from the real-
ities of the common law system by the contemporary
materialistic-idealistic speculations which captivated the
brilliant mind of his friend Holmes. Instead, Brandeis even
through the years they both served on the Supreme Court,
continually tried to persuade Holmes to replace his specu-
lative questionings with an insatiable concern for the facts
of life, and particularly, in this era, for the facts in the eco-
nomic sphere. Though never quite successful, it was perhaps
due in part to Brandeis' arguments, that Holmes, at least
as early as 1897,12 lent his support to the recognition of the
need for social considerations in the law. By that time
Brandeis, in his M.I.T. lectures, had already indicated the
innovations in the training of lawyers which were henceforth
to be associated with his name: the study of labor law and
of the use of the equitable remedy of injunction in labor
disputes; the limitation of monopolies, the analysis of patent
rights held by corporate entities, and the curbing of unfair
trade practices; and the advancement of administrative tri-
bunals and fact-finding agencies, as developed by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission,' 3 and by the State of Wis-
consin, in part through the influence of his friends, Senator
LaFollette 14 and President Van Hise of Wisconsin Uni-
versity. The expansion of the principle of judicial notice in
the law of evidence to include compilations of documented
facts, which resulted in the Brandeis Brief, was an innova-
tion as important in its implications for the growth of the
common law as the introduction of equity, of mercantile law,
or of canon law principles on adoption or wills, had been
in earlier days. Brandeis' devotion to realities, and to their
place in the common law system, notwithstanding the phil-
osophically unrealistic jurisprudential speculations with
which he was surrounded, held him closer than many of his
ablest associates to the sound foundations of the living law.
22 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 H. v. L. REV. 457 (1897) ; COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 184 (1920).13 LLOYD, WEALTH AGAINST COMMONWEALTH 19 (1894).
14 THE BRANDEIS GumE To THE MODERN WORLD 281 (Lief ed. 1941) ; LIEF,
BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 206, 489-491
(1936).
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Protesting more than once that he had no philosophy
of law and subscribed to no theoretical system, he neverthe-
less devised a jurisprudential pattern of thought which has
had immense influence on the ablest young men who have
entered the legal profession during the first half of the twen-
tieth century. "I have no rigid social philosophy," he de-
clared at one time, "I have been too intense on concrete
problems of practical justice." 15 Elsewhere he explained,
"I have no general philosophy; all my life I have thought
only in connection with the facts which came before me." 16
It was this emphasis on facts, on the concrete as distin-
guished from those abstractions which had led so many of
his contemporary jurists away from the realities of the com-
mon law foundations, which gave the decisive character to
the Brandeis theory.
Brandeis thought of law as an instrument, a device, or a
system of devices, through which greater justice could be
effected in the lives of men. Because of its significance in
the lives of human beings, law was to him both art and
science and worthy of the highest effort possible. He did
not, however, spin out theories to which he would coerce men
to conform, as so many of the absolutists among "economic
planners" who have misunderstood his leadership have at-
tempted to do. By his resolute rejection of speculations in
the abstract, he implied a repudiation not only of the Kantian
separation of mind from body, but also of the Cartesian em-
phasis on thought to the subordination of existence. In other
words, Brandeis would not have said, "I think, therefore
you ought," with Kant, any more than he would have said,
"I think, therefore I-and you--exist," with Descartes. On
the contrary, had he formulated his philosophy in an
aphorism, he would have been more likely to say, "I am and
you are, and therefore I think." His approach was objective
rather than subjective. For that reason, it was closer to
the realism of the common law than much of the thinking
of his contemporaries and followers. Unhappily it was
listened to for the most part by men who, in being less reso-
15 BRANDEIS, BUsINESS-A PROFESSION iii (new ed. 1933).
26 THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WOuiLD 209, 428 (Lief ed. 1941).
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lute in rejecting the abstract, were more conditioned by the
prevailing subjectivism of contemporary American philos-
ophy than by objective realism. Among those trained to
think of logic as an instrument of inquiry in the John Dewey
school,17 the Brandeis concept of law as an instrument of
social policy has been understood as a weapon for absolutist
regimentation instead of a rational approach to life's prob-
lems designed to appeal to each and every person endowed
with human reason.
Louis Brandeis' first field of specialization in the law
comprised the rules of evidence. He lectured on evidence at
Harvard Law School 18 and it was out of his mastery of that
subject that he expanded the principle of judicial notice to
cover wider knowledge of the facts of life as ascertained and
documented through fact-finding investigative agencies. The
Brandeis Brief was essentially a contribution to the law of
evidence. No less important was his constant insistence on
the facts in every aspect of his thinking.. It was the objec-
tivity of his search for facts-for evidence-which gives dis-
tinctive character to his significance for jurisprudence. "Out
of the facts grows the law," he told the Harvard Ethical
Society in 1905.11 On the other hand, "Law," he said, "has
everywhere a tendency to lag behind the facts of life." 20
The practical effects of this, in America, he added, were that
"the strain became dangerous, because constitutional limita-
tions were invoked to stop the natural vent of legislation." 21
With the wisdom of legislation he was not concerned, feeling
that in a democracy the people who expressed their views
through their representatives were entitled to careful con-
sideration. What did concern him was the attitude of the
courts in attempting to apply preconceived opinions in their
interpretations of legislation covering factual situations. In
the Burns Baking Company case occurs one of his strongest
statements about the importance of facts:
37 Rooney, Law and the New Logic, 16 PRoc. Am. CATm. PnILos. Ass'N
197-199 (1940).
i 8 LiEF, BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AmEmICAN IDEAL 26
(1936).
19 BRANDEis, BusIiEss-A PROFESSION iii (new ed. 1933).2 0 BRAqDEIs, THE CURSE Op BIGNESS 319 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
21 Ibid.
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Unless we know the facts on which legislators may have acted, we
cannot properly decide whether they were (or whether their measures
are) unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Knowledge is essential
to understanding and understanding should precede judging. Some-
times, if we would guide by the light of reason we must let our minds
be bold.22
The method which he devised to persuade the courts of
the inadequacy of their concepts was consciously inductive.
"In the past," he notes, "the courts have reached their con-
clusions largely deductively from preconceived notions and
precedents; the method I have tried to employ in arguing
cases before them has been inductive, reasoning from the
facts." 23 The persuasiveness of his utilization of facts as
argumentation 24 was so effective that in less than ten years
from the time he introduced the now famous "Brandeis
Brief" he could tell the Chicago Bar Association in a no less
famous address entitled "The Living Law" 25 that
The court reawakened to the truth of the old maxim of the civilians,
Ex facto jus oritur. It realized that no law, written or unwritten,
can be understood without full knowledge of the facts out of which
it arises and to which it is to be applied. But the struggle for the
living law has not yet been fully won.2 6
The following year, in one of his first dissenting opinions
after his appointment to the Supreme Court, he still found
it necessary to say:
Whether a measure relating to the public welfare is arbitrary or un-
reasonable, whether it has no substantial relation to the end proposed,
is obviously not to be determined by assumptions or by a priori rea-
soning. The judgment should be based upon a consideration of rele-
vant facts, actual or possible-Ex facto jus oritur. That ancient rule
must prevail in order that we may have a system of living law.
2 7
Since he felt that "the earlier attitude of the judges was
due to their theorizing on the subject instead of drawing in-
22 
THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 98 (Lief
coll. 1930).23 BRANDEIS, BusiNESss-A PRoFEssIoN iv (new ed. 1933).24 MR. JusTIcE BRANDEIS 175 (Frankfurter ed. 1932).
25 Title, but not method, apparently borrowed from Erlich's Seminar of
Living Law at Czernowitz, described in PAGE, PRoc. Ass'N Am. LAW SCHOOLS
(1914).
26 THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WORLD 165 (Lief ed. 1941).
27 Dissent in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 597, 61 L. ed. 1336, 1344;
THE BRANDEIS GumF, TO THE MODERN4 WORLD 65 (Lief ed. 1941).
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ferences from existing facts" 2s one of his biographers says
of him that "he urged his companions of the conference rooms
to slough off the shackles of precedents which no longer could
apply because of new facts arising since the first enunciation
of a rule" with the comment that ,"modification implies
growth; it is the life of the law." 29 By 1921, he was able to
write, though still in a dissenting opinion:
The change in the law by which strikes were once illegal and even
criminal and are now recognized as lawful was effected in America
largely without the intervention of legislation. This reversal of the
common-law rule was not due to the rejection by the courts of one
principle and the adoption in its stead of another, but to a better
realization. When centralization in the control of business brought
its corresponding centralization in the organization of workingmen,
new facts had to be appraised. 30
Nor was his influence in the new direction confined only
to the courts. Through his life-long interest in legal edu-
cation and by means of his close association with Harvard
Law School, he was instrumental in effecting a far-reaching
change in the training of law students. A biographer tells
us that
George W. Kirchwey of the Columbia Law School discussed with
him the need of constructive work to restore respect for the law. This
led to definite conclusions involving an extension of the functions of
law schools, and he convinced the authorities at Harvard that legal
education should be socialized; lawyers should not merely learn rules
of law but their purpose and effect on the affairs of men. For this
they must study the facts-human, industrial, social-to which laws
were to be applied.31
It may perhaps be noted here as well as anywhere that
Mr. Justice Brandeis has not been particularly fortunate in
his biographers and commentators. Often they seem to have
read into his opinions, official and unofficial, their personal
preconceptions of law and government, derived less from the
sound Anglo-American legal system-which, even by the
28 THE BAmzm~s GurmE TO THE MODEMRx WoR 285 (Lief ed. 1941).
29 LEF, BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 429
(1936).
so Dissent in Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 479, 65 L. ed. 349, 362
(1921).
3'Li , BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 429
(1936).
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pragmatic test, has worked well enough to have survived
many challenges-than from the theorizing of European
writers who, to say the least, have been faced with situations
and facts quite different in many respects from those pre-
vailing in America. So here, the word "socialized" has an
unfortunate connotation in connection with the advancement
of "socialism." If it be understood in that sense, it is as far
as anything could be from Mr. Justice Brandeis' views.32 He
was interested in the welfare of the people and to that cause
he may properly be said to have been concerned with social
interests, but he was definitely opposed to state ownership
of property, which is fundamental to socialism, and his
efforts in the economic sphere were constantly spent in sup-
port of private enterprise, and of wider distribution of goods
through increased consumption, based primarily upon an
adequate living wage.
If the term "socialized" be used to refer to what has come
to be known as the "sociological school of jurisprudence," 33
a distinction must still be made between Dean Pound's con-
tributions and those of Justice Brandeis to that school and
its place in legal education at Harvard. Mr. Justice Holmes,
in the Harvard Law Review for 1897, had suggested that the
training of lawyers and judges be such as to lead "them
habitually to consider more definitely and explicitly the
social advantage on which the rule they lay down be
justified," 14 but with Mr. Justice Holmes so great an em-
phasis was put on "social advantage" that individual rights
were subordinated unduly, at least in theory, to the welfare
of society. With Dean Pound, the sociological school of
jurisprudence was underwritten with a broad idealistic phil-
osophical foundation which was quite foreign to Mr. Justice
Brandeis' concern with concrete facts. In view of what
Mr. Lief says about Justice Brandeis' discussion with Mr.
Kirchwey of Columbia Law School, it seems likely that Dean
32 THE BRANDEIS GuIDE TO THE MODERN WORL 164 (Lief ed. 1941)
(gives his views on nationalization of land).
33 Id. at 165.34 Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 468 (1897); Cou.LaLrE LEGAL
PAPERS 184 (1920); cf. Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1915); COL-
LECTED LEGAL PAPERS 307 (1920) ; but for criticism see Rooney, Pluralism and
the Law, 13 NEw SCHOLASTIC 305 (1939).
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Pound's article on "The Need for a Sociological Juris-
prudence" " as well as the lectures he gave at about the same
time at Columbia Law School, which were published in the
Harvard Law Review under the title of "The Scope and Pur-
pose of Sociological Jurisprudence," 31 may have had con-
siderable significance with respect to his appointment as
Story Professor at Harvard Law School in 1911 and as Dean
in 1916. A careful analysis of Dean Pound's writings, in
comparison with Justice Brandeis', discloses so great a con-
trast in their treatment of the essentials of the common law
system, however, as to indicate little in common with respect
to method. The differences which characterize the intel-
lectual achievements of the great leaders of what has been
loosely referred to as the "sociological school of jurispru-
dence'--Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Pound-provide as
fascinating a field for analysis as can be found in contem-
porary American thought.
More than the others, Mr. Justice Brandeis places faith
in human reason. Mr. Justice Frankfurter puts it this way:
All men have some ultimate postulates by which they wrest a private
world of order from the chaos of the world. The essential postulate
of Mr. Justice Brandeis is effective and generous opportunity for the
unflagging operation of reason. He is not theory-ridden himself and
would not impose theories on others.37
Similarly, I. Dilliard notes that "his faith in the human
mind and in the will and capacity of the people to understand
and grasp a tr~h never wavered or tired." 38 Justice
Brandeis himself declared that "we need more minds, not
fewer," 39 and at another time he said of the people that
"they must think; democracy is only possible, industrial
democracy, among people who think, among people who are
above the average intelligence . . . it is earned by effort
-.. there is no effort... so taxing to the individual as to
think, to analyze fundamentally." 40
35 GREEN BAG (Oct. 1907) ; Pnoc. An. BAR Ass'N (1907).
3824 H~Av. L. REv. 591-619 (1911); 25 HARV. L. REv. 140-168 (1911).
37 MR JusTIcE BRANDEIS 117 (Frankfurter ed. 1932).3 8 DnnMwzA, MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS, GRAnT AmEmcAN 125-6 (1941).
39 CURsE oF BIGNESS 185 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
40 Id. at 36.
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His faith in the human mind was the basis for Justice
Brandeis' continual interest in education. Of some who mis-
understood his efforts in this regard, a biographer says,
"They had failed to grasp the fact that -education itself 'is an
essential element' of the Brandeis plan; they had not seen
that in a democracy the work of enlightenment must go on
continuously even though its results are slow, discour-
aging." 41 All stages are covered in his pleas for education.
He speaks of "the enlightenment which comes with the neces-
sary thinking that trade-union agitation compels." 42 His
concern with law schools has already been mentioned. With
respect to the improvement of the courts lie says, "What we
must do in America is not to attack our judges but to edu-
cate them." 43 At another time he suggests that "instead
of amending the Constitution Ifwould amend men's economic
and social ideals." 44 He was particularly concerned about
the effects of physical exhaustion from excessive working
hours upon the necessary education of the people, saying in
this connection:
For the attainment of such an education, such mental development,
it is essential that the education shall be continuous throughout life,
and an essential condition of such continuous education is free time;
that is, leisure; and leisure does not merely imply time for rest, but
free time when body and mind are sufficiently fresh to permit mental
effort.4 5
In fact, as Walton Hamilton puts it, he had a faith in
intellectual procedures which yielded place only to a ruling
passion for social righteousness.46 His conviction that
knowledge brings not only power 47 but virtue is reminiscent
of Socrates,48 for knowledge with him was desired less for
its own sake than for its potentialities in the solution of those
new problems which arise from new situations. As Mr.
Justice Frankfurter says,
41 MASON, THE BRANDEIS WAY 298 (1938).
42 BRANDEIS, BUSINEss-A PROFESSION 18 (new ed. 1933).
43 BRANDEIS, BUSINEss-A PROFESSION liv (new ed. 1933) ; THE BRANDEIS
GUIDE TO THE MODERN WORLD 122 (Lief ed. 1941).
44 THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WORLD 66 (Lief ed. 1941).
45 BRANDEIS, BUSINEss-A PROFESSION 33 (new ed. 1933).
46 MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 189 (Frankfurter ed. 1932).
47 BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WORLD 127 (Lief ed. 1941).
48 MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 124 (Frankfurter ed. 1932).
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All his work has been, and is intended to be, chiefly educative. Prob-
lems with him are never solved. Problems to him are merely stages
in the continuous processes of civilization. And so we find his in-
sistence on difficulties, on the necessity for continuity of effort, on
sustained interest, on the need of constant alertness, to the fact that
the introduction or the invention of new forces may beget new
difficulties.49
For Mr. Justice Brandeis, thinking is both influential
and inventive, but objective rather than partisan. "Problems
of the trade," he says, are "not problems of one side or an-
other of a controversy." 50 "Some of these questions," he
points out, "are very difficult questions; they are questions
which call for the inventive faculties, questions which involve
experiments, questions which compel deep thinking." 51 Else-
where he refers to invention in broader terms: "To secure
social advance we must regard the field of sociology and so-
cial legislation as a field for discovery and invention ... we
must rely upon all America (and the rest of the world) for
our social inventions and discoveries .... The process
of social invention he proposes for the law is the process of
trial and error which has proven fruitful in the physical
sciences. In one of his later dissenting opinions he says:
"The court bows to the lessons of experience and the force
of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and
error, so fruitful in the physical sciences is appropriate also
in the judicial function." 53 And in another dissenting opin-
ion he says, "In the search for truth through the slow process
of inclusion and exclusion, involving trial and error, it be-
hooves us to reject, as guides, the decisions upon such ques-
tions which prove to have been mistaken." 54 Perhaps the
most famous formulation of his thought on experimentation
occurs in his dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebman, where he says,
49 BRANDEIS, BusINEss-A PROFESSION Ix (new ed. 1933).
50 CURSE OF BIGNESS 84 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
51 Ibid.5 2 THE BRANDEIS GUmE TO THE MODERN WORLD 281 (Lief ed. 1941).
53 Dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 405, 76 L.
ed. 815, 823 (1932) ; THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WOILD 169 (Lief
ed. 1941).
54 Dissent in DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34, 37, 71 L. ed. 524, 527
(1927); THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WORLD 169 (Lief ed. 1941).
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The discoveries in physical science, the triumphs in invention, attest
the value of the process of trial and error. In large measure, these
advances have been due to experimentation. In those fields experi-
mentation has, for two centuries, been not only free but encouraged.
Some people assert that our present plight is due, in part, to the limi-
tations set by courts upon experimentation in the fields of social and
economic science; and to the discouragement to which proposals for
betterment there have been subjected otherwise. There must be
power in the States and the nation to remold, through experimenta-
tion, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social
and economic needs. I cannot believe that the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment, or the States which ratified it, intended to de-
prive us of the power to correct the evils of technological unemploy-
ment and excess productive capacity which have attended progress
in the useful arts.
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught
with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy in-
cidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This
Court has the power to prevent an experiment.55
The argument which he submitted to the United States
Supreme Court in the Minimum Wage Case touches further
upon experimentation and the United States Constitution.
After pointing out that Canadian minimum wage legislation
had been given effect through experiment carried on under
a government without the specific constitutional limitation
here invoked, he goes on to say,
In any or all this legislation there may be economic and social error.
But our social and industrial welfare demands that ample scope
should be given for social as well as mechanical inventions. It is a
condition not only of progress but of conserving that which we have.
Nothing could be more revolutionary than to close the door to social
experimentation. The whole subject of woman's entry into industry
is an experiment. And surely the federal constitution-itself perhaps
the greatest of human experiments-does not prohibit such modest
attempts as the woman's minimum-wage act to reconcile the existing
industrial system with our striving for social justice and the preserva-
tion of the race.5 6
55285 U. S. 262, 310, 76 L. ed. 747, 771 (1932).
56 THF CURSE OF BIGNESS 68-9 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
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One of his commentators makes a point about his views
on experimentation with specific reference to the Constitu-
tion which merits quotation here:
Lest the revolutionary character of the Brandeis influence and the
Brandeis philosophy and ideals be placed in the wrong perspective, it
should never be forgotten that a starting-point with him is always that
our constitution is an inspiration, elastic enough, if wisely inter-
preted, to permit all needed growth; that slow, patient and studious
experiment is better than sweeping and abstract theory; and that
large, violent theoretical change is to be shunned.Y5
He had learned from his professor of constitutional law,
James Bradley Thayer, his biographers tell us, that "the
Constitution has ample resources within itself to meet the
changing needs of successive generations." 58
In acknowledging that "the field of social invention is
a field higher than that which presents itself in the mecha-
nized world," 59 Mr. Justice Brandeis feels that "when we
know that the evil exists which it is sought to remedy, the
legislature must be given latitude in experimentation." 00
The question which the court should ask in reviewing legis-
lative action of the states is whether an evil exists. "If there
is an evil," he says, "is the remedy, this particular device in-
troduced by the legislature, directed to remove that evil
which threatens health, morals, and welfare.., an arbitrary
exercise of power?" I" By thus giving broad scope to ex-
perimentation in the "political and social laboratories" of
the forty-eight states, 2 Mr. Justice Brandeis hopes to en-
courage creative thinking of the highest type within the legal
sphere-thinking which stops not with the invention of a
legislative device but only with its employment in the mecha-
nism of justice. As Walton Hamilton says of him,
As with all creative effort, it is not the device, but the skilled use of
the device, not the procedure, but the procedure suited to the occa-
sion, which reveals the craftsman.... The key to the judicial tech-
57 OTHER PEOPE's MONEY xxiv (1932).
5 MR. jusTicz BRANDEIS 53 (Frankfurter ed. 1932); f. MASON, BRANDEIS
AID THE MODERN STATE 111 (1933); LVY, OuR CONSTITUTION: TOOL OR
TESTAMENT 248 (1941).
59 Tn BRANDEIS GUIDE To THE MODERN WoiRD 78 (Lief ed. 1941).60 TiE CUs op BiG'ESs 65 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
elId. at 68.
62 THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO ThZ MODERN Womb 281 (Lief ed. 1941).
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nique of Mr. justice Brandeis is not far to seek . . . . He knows
that usages employed in the process of judgment are inventions con-
trived to serve ends of justice; he regards them as instruments to be
employed rather than as compulsions to be obeyed; and as conditions
change and common sense gives way to its better, he would keep them
alive by fresh contact with reality .... The very conception of the
instrumental character of the mechanism of justice makes the intel-
lectual views of the man dominant in the opinions of Mr. Justice
Brandeis. 68
The reason Justice Brandeis was concerned that experi-
mentation and inventive thinking be fostered and encouraged
in the legal world was because he believed that "the aspira-
tions of the people must have adequate legal expression." 64
He went on to say that the whole industrial world is in a
state of ferment and that the people are beginning to doubt
whether political democracy and industrial absolutism can
coexist in the same community. The people's thought would
take shape in action, he felt, if given proper opportunity,
and "it lies with our lawyers to say in what lines that
action shall be expressed; wisely and temperately, or wildly
and intemperately; in lines of evolution or in lines of
revolution." 65
Since the most insistent problems in the modern world
affecting the common welfare are found in the sphere of cor-
porate management and labor relations, Justice Brandeis'
greatest concern was the adaptation of legal rules to fit the
facts of industrial life. The lawyers' task in correcting the
evils of industrial absolutism he considered similar to their
earlier task with respect to political absolutism. Since the
advanced state, to some extent through the efforts of lawyers,
is now no longer absolutistic but instead guarantees political
freedom under constitutional and democratic forms, its assis-
tance should be used in some way, he feels, to help the
workers to attain democracy in industry since that would be
in the public interest And he carried the analogy between
political and industrial democracy even -further when he said,
In order that collective bargaining should result in industrial democ-
3 M_ JusTicE BaRnaxs 182-3 (Frankfurter ed. 1932).64 Busn-Ess-A PRomssioN lv (new ed. 1933).
O Id. at Ivi.
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racy it must go further and create practically an industrial govern-
ment-a relation between employer and employee where the problems
as they arise from day to day . .. may come up for consideration
and solution as they come up in our political government. 66
The modern private corporation has grown so gigantic
that it has become a danger to society, a power divorced from
its myriad stockholders, shirking moral responsibility, and
is in effect a threat to the state itself, an actual state within
a state.0 7 An unfortunate element in the situation, he felt,
lay in the fact that "the civilized world today believes that
in the industrial world self-government is impossible; that
we must adhere to the system which we have known as the
monarchical system." 68 One way to correct the situation is
by way of limitation of corporate size through legislative
action by the state.6 9 Another is to secure to the workingman
"not only a voice but a vote, not merely a right to be heard,
but a position through which labor may participate in man-
agement." 70 It is the sharing of responsibility, when it
comes, that will indicate full-grown industrial democracy.7 1
Since democracy implies rule of the people, "the end for
which we must strive," he says, "is the attainment of rule by
the people, and that involves industrial democracy as well
as political." 72
Through democracy, both political and industrial,
greater liberty is possible. Since lawyers have tradition-
ally worked for liberty, their obligation to further democracy,
industrial as well as political, is fundamental to their pro-
fession, in Mr. Justice Brandeis' mind. At one time he said,
The great achievement of the English-speaking people is the attain-
ment of liberty through law. It is natural, therefore, that those who
have been trained in the law should have borne an important part in
the struggle for liberty and in the government which resulted. 73
66 THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 78-9 (Fraenkel ed. 1934) ; THE BRANDEIS GuiDE
TO THE MODEM WORLD 134 (Lief ed. 1941).
67 LIEF, BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AmEICAN IDEAL 329
(1936).68 TnE CURSE OF BIGNESS 35 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
69 Id. at 80.
70 Id. at 83.
71 THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WORLD 94 (Lief ed. 1941).
72 THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 73 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
3 BusINEss-A PROFESSION 330 (new ed. 1933) ; THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO
THE MODERN WORLD 174 (Lief ed. 1941).
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Elsewhere he ties the function of law and industrial liberty
into the whole Anglo-American legal tradition, when he says,
The history of Anglo-Saxon and of American liberty rests upon that
struggle to resist wrong-to resist it at any cost when first offered
rather than to pay the penalty of ignominious surrender. It is the
old story of the "ship money," of "the writs of assistance," and of
"taxation without representation." The struggle for industrial liberty
must follow the same lines.74
The value of liberty is repeatedly stressed by Mr. Justice
Brandeis in such terms as these:
We set out with the principle . . . the fundamental policy of the
Anglo-American people, that liberty should not be restricted except
in so far as required, for the public welfare, health, safety, morals,
and general public conditions. . . . The liberty of each individual
must be limited in such a way that it leaves to others the possibility
of individual liberty.7 5
And, again:
What are American ideals? They are the development of the in-
dividual for his own and the common good, the development of the
individual through liberty, and the attainment of the common good
through democracy and social justice. Our form of government, as
well as humanity, compels us to strive for the development of the
individual man.76
But, in order to attain the necessary degree of liberty, politi-
cal democracy, for Justice Brandeis, is insufficient without
industrial democracy, and the right to manage one's own
economic affairs. In 1911 he declared that
Politically, the American workingman is free-so far as law can make
him so . . . . Men are not free while financially dependent upon
the will of other individuals. Financial dependance is consistent
with freedom only where claim to support rests upon right, not upon
favor.77
It is because "we want to have the workingman free;
not to have him the beneficiary of a benevolent employer," 78
that Justice Brandeis looks to the law to break down privi-
74 BusiNss-A PROFESSION 24 (new ed. 1933) ; THE BRANDEIS Gumn To
THE MODERN WORLD 131 (Lief ed. 1941).
75 THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS OF MR. JusTIcE BRANDEIS 377, (Lief
coll. 1930); THE BRANDEIS GUmE TO THE MODERN WORLD 290 (Lief ed. 1941).
76 BusINESs-A PROFESSION 366 (new ed. 1933).
77 Id. at 59.
78 MASON, THE BRANDEIS WAY 159 (1938).
THE BRANDEIS THEORY
lege and strengthen rights in order that it may properly com-
mand respect.79
In view of the unrest in this country, in view of the widespread feel-
ing that law is something different for the rich than for the poor, it
is of the utmost importance that men should not trifle with the law,
... that they should look upon it as a standard to be lived up to;
and that they should recognize that the law is supreme over man,
and in this republic, exists for all men alike.80
It is the small man who needs the protection of the law, he
feels, "but the law becomes the instrument by which he is
destroyed." 81 This situation "is largely the result of un-
wise, man-made privilege creating law," he says,82 and there-
fore the legislatures and the courts cannot "sit idly by while
through concentration and utilization of economic power,
strong-willed industrialists make over our civilization." 83
Although he looks to the law for help, Justice Brandeis
does not place full reliance upon legislation to effect the
necessary change. "I have grave doubt," he says, "as to how
much can be accomplished by legislation, unless it be to set
a limit upon the size of corporate units." 84 Furthermore,
since "remedial institutions are apt to fall under the control
of the enemy and to become instruments of oppression," he
believes we should "seek for betterment within the broad
lines of existing institutions.., constant inquiry into facts
.. .and much experimentation." 11 "rWe should not regl-
late anything by law except where an evil exists which the
existing forces of unionism or otherwise (employers' asso-
ciations, consumers' cooperatives, etc.) are unable to deal
with." 86
In accordance with his faith in human reason, Justice
Brandeis places greater reliance on self-government than he
does on legal instrumentalities, no matter how ingeniously
79See LiF, BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AmERmCAN IDEAL 257(1936); THE BRAiDEIS GUmE TO THE MODERN WORLD 193 (Lief ed. 1941)
(Law must be respectable).8 0 THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WORLD 166 (Lief ed. 1941).81 
MR JusTIcE BRANDEIS 133 (Frankfurter ed. 1932).82 1bid.
83 Ibid.84 MAsON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE 79 (1933).85 OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY xmv; THE BRANDEIS GumE TO THE MODERN
Wova 51 (Lief ed. 1941).86 MASON, THE BRANDEIS WAY 36 (1938).
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devised. Liberty is self-wrought, largely self-imposed, he
feels, and "freedom cannot be conferred by decrees of gov-
ernment." 87 Elsewhere he points out that "democracy exists
only as the people take upon their own shoulders the respon-
sibility for their own welfare." 8 The fundamental cause
of the wars lay not so much in economic ambitions and
treaty violations as in "the longing of the people for self-
government, for self-expression; and the mistaken belief on
one side or the other that this self-development justly
requires the subjection of other peoples." 89 With self-
government, democracy goes hand in hand. As he expresses
it,
Democracy in any sphere is a serious undertaking. It substitutes
self-restraint for external restraint. It is more difficult to maintain
than to achieve. It demands continuous sacrifice by the individual
and more exigent obedience to the moral law than any other form
of government. Success in any democratic undertaking must pro-
ceed from the individual. It is possible only when the process of per-
fecting the individual is pursued. His development is attained mainly
in the processes of common living.90
So consistent is he in his conviction about the necessity of
self-government that he believed the country should go back
to the concept of federation, letting each state reach for self-
development and evolve its own sound policy.91 He felt that
NIRA, purporting industrial self-government, actually sur-
rendered control of production, of prices and trade practices,
to a small group of big corporate employers, to the destruc-
tion of all competition.92 He held that widely distributed
stock ownership, whether or not among employees, had the
effect of destroying moral responsibility on the part of those
who profited from a corporation's activities.93 The New Deal,
in spite of its adoption of many of his devices and sugges-
8 Id. at 18.
88 Id. at 297.
89 THs CURSE OF BIGNESS 268 (Fraenkel ed. 1939).
90 Id. at 270.
91 LIEF, BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 470
(1936).
92 MASON, THE BRANDEIS WAY 80 (1938).
93 THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 169 (Fraenkel ed. 1934) ; THE BRANDEIS GUIDE
TO THE MODERN WORLD 238 (Lief ed. 1941); LIEF, BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL
HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 453 (1936).
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tions, tended, he felt, toward a centralization of govern-
mental power 94 which was undesirable in its effect on human
personality.
His concern for self-government is based upon his con-
fidence in the capacity of men to do more in the interests
of justice than they usually have been permitted to do
through faulty organization of human energies. Good gov-
ernment established through laws which adequately meet the
capacities of men would not limit but would encourage men
to utilize their powers. "The margin between that which
men naturally do and which they can do is so great," he says,
"that a system which urges men on to action, enterprise and
initiative, is preferable in spite of the wastes that necessarily
attend that process." 95 Elsewhere he relates this need for
development to the United States Constitution, when he says,
The "right to life" guaranteed by our Constitution is now being in-
terpreted according to demands of social justice and of democracy as
the right to live, and not merely to exist. In order to live, men must
have the opportunity of developing their faculties, and they must live
under conditions in which their faculties may develop naturally and
healthily.98
One of the reasons Justice Brandeis is convinced of the
necessity of a living wage for all is his belief that financial
independence is essential to the proper development of char-
acter. "It is in the proper spending of the dollar," he says,
"that both men and women can best show their efficiency." 97
After pointing out that "half a century ago nearly every
American boy could look forward to becoming independent
as a farmer or mechanic, in business or in professional
life," 98 he notes that under modern industrial conditions,
"at least twenty-one of the twenty-four hours are devoted to
subsistence and a small fraction of the day is left for
living." 99  Such a situation indicates an inverted sense of
values in which property is served to the detriment of human-
ity instead of its benefit.
9 4 DILLARD, MR. JusTiCE BRANDEIS, GREAT AmERICAN 59 (1941).
95 THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 116 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).98 THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WORLD 66 (Lief ed. 1941).
97 Id. at 294.
98 BUSINEss-A PROFESSION 71 (new ed. 1933).
99 Id. at 30.
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"Property is only a means," he says. "It has been the frequent error
of our courts that they have made the means an end. Correct that
error, put property back into its proper place, and the whole social-
legal conception becomes at once consistent." 100
By securing to each individual financial independence
and the right to participate in the making of the laws under
which he lives not only in the political sphere but also in
the industrial, men can best-achieve the fullest development
of their powers. It is in "sbgdieflce to the laws which the
people make for themselves in a business, and not tde laws
which are made for them and in the making of which they
have no part," 101 that real democracy is achieved. Democ-
racy, industrial as well as political, is therefore the end
toward which Mr. Justice Brandeis looks in his efforts for
social justice. He puts it this way:
We must bear in mind all the time that however much we may desire
material improvement and must desire it for the comfort of the in-
dividual, that the United States is a democracy, and that we must
have, above all things, men. It is the development of manhood to
which any industrial and social system should be directed. We Amer-
icans are committed not only to social justice in the sense of avoiding
things which bring suffering and harm, like unjust distribution of
wealth, but we are committed primarily to democracy. The social
justice for which we are striving is an incident of our democracy, not
the main end. It is rather the result of democracy-perhaps its finest
expression-but it rests upon democracy, which implies the rule of
the people. And therefore the end for which we must strive is the
attainment of rule by the people, and that involves industrial democ-
racy as well as political democracy.10 2
In the development of democracy and self-government,
not uniformity but differentiation is desirable. "What we
want," Justice Brandeis says, "is not a dominant race or
races, not uniformity, but what Felix Adler expressed as
'the utmost differentiation of the type of culture, the utmost
variety and richness in the expression of fundamental human
faculties.'" 103 Elsewhere he says, "Democracy rejected the
100 THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN' WORLD 231 (Lief ed. 1941).
101 THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 35 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
202 THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 382 (Lief
coil. 1930).
03OTHE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WoR.D 313 (Lief ed. 1941);
DE HAAS, Lous D. BRANDEIS, A BIOGRAPHICAL SITCH 221 (1929).
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proposal of the superman who should rise through the sac-
rifice of the many; it insists that the development of each
individual is not only a right, but a duty to society, and that
our best hope for civilization lies not in uniformity, but in
wide differentiation." 104
The allusion here to "a duty to society" raises a ques-
tion as to whether Mr. Justice Brandeis shifted his attention
somewhat from the individual man and his development
toward society and the group after 1910 when he first be-
came conscious of his racial heritage as a Jew. Belief in the
Jewish religion had never been part of his upbringing, his
family having drifted away from synagogue membership sev-
eral generations earlier.10 5 In coming to America, they took
part from the beginning in the political and educational life
around them, so that aside from family connections, their
associates were mostly native Americans of German and
English descent. Especially in Cambridge and Boston,
where Louis Brandeis made' friends in the best circles
through his brilliant record at Harvard Law School, the
environment was conducive to the adoption of traditional
American ideals rather than to any attraction for the age-
old Jewish culture. It is therefore not surprising that his
early thought reflected the views he had learned in American
schools and in influential American homes. This would ac-
count for the familiar ring of his concern for liberty,
education, justice, independence, responsibility, and self-
government under the provisions of the United States Con-
stitution. The enlargement of his views from political to
industrial democracy was a natural result of the labor
troubles which grew steadily in significance during his early
manhood. That he was interested in the Fabian movement
in England without being influenced to adopt socialism is an
indication of the soundness of his understanding of American
principles of government and of the acuteness of his legal
mind. When his sympathies with labor led to his appoint-
ment to arbitrate the difficulties of the garment workers in
104 THE CURSE OF BIGNEss 221-222 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
205 LiEp, BRANDEIS, THE PERsoNAL HISTORY OF AN AmEmICAN IDEAL 16(1936).
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New York, where employers and employees both were Jewish,
he is known to have developed a new interest in Jewish people
and their ideas which was different from anything he had
hitherto experienced.' 06 From that time on there is observ-
able in his writings an emphasis on society and the group
which is at variance with his earlier concern with the wei-
far of the individual workingman. Whether he was con-
scious of the change of viewpoint is not quite clear, although
frequently in his later writings he undertook to reconcile
Jewish philosophy with American ideals by postulating that
the latter were the political expression of the former's
goals.10 7 What he has to say upon this point and the impli-
cations of his thoughts about society and the individual are
pertinent here.
Perhaps the strongest statement he made regarding the
superiority of society to the individual was made in 1921 in
his dissenting opinion in the Duplex Printing case, where
he says:
All rights are derived from the purposes of the society in which they
exist; above all rights rises duty to the community. 08
Elsewhere speaking of the Jews and their rights as a group,
he says,
This right of development on the part of the group is essential to the
full enjoyment of rights by the individual. For the individual is de-
pendent for his development (and his happiness) in large part upon
the development of the group of which he forms a part. 0 9
An earlier statement, made in 1902, indicates a feeling even
then for brotherhood in the Jewish sense as distinguished
from altruism as John Stuart Mill, for example, would have
described it:
The spirit which subordinates the interests of the individual to that
of the class is the spirit of brotherhood-a near approach to altruism;
it reaches pure altruism when it involves a sacrifice of present in-
terests for the welfare of others in the distant future.1 0
1o6 LiRI, BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AmEmCAN IDEAL 191
(1936); DE HAAS, Louis D. BRANDEIS, A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 221 (1929).
107 DE HAAS, Louis D. BRANDEIS, A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 203 (1929).
108254 U. S. 443, 479, 65 L. ed. 349, 362 (1921); SOCIAL AND ECONO,IC
VIEws OF MR. JUsTICE BRANDEIS 26 (Lief -coll. 1930).
109 DE HAAS, Louis D. BRANDEIS, A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 171 (1929).
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Ten years later he told the Young Men's Hebrew Association
in Chelsea:
But the ages of sacrifice have left us with the sense of brotherhood;
that brotherhood has given us the feeling of solidarity which makes
each one of us press forward with loyalty to fulfil the obligations of
the brotherhood. 11'
The connection between the Jewish idea of brotherhood
and the American idea of justice he expresses in this way:
Our teaching of brotherhood and righteousness has, under the name
of democracy and social justice, become the twentieth-century striving
of America and western Europe.112
From this foundation of brotherhood, the striving for democ-
racy derives its ethical value, he believes:
This great ethical movement for real brotherhood of man reinforces
the demand of the workingman for wages, hours and conditions
which will permit of his living according to those higher standards
essential to life, health and the performance of the duties of citizen-
ship in a democracy."13
In a paragraph of the address he delivered before the
Menorah Society of Columbia University in 1914, he dis-
closes that the real source of this Jewish doctrine of brother-
hood with its implicit subordination of the individual to the
welfare of the group is to be found in the Jewish doctrine
of immortality. On this point he says:
To describe the Jew as an individualist is to state a most misleading
half-truth. He has to a rare degree merged his individuality and his
interests in the community of which he forms a part. This is evi-
denced among other things by his attitude toward immortality ...
despite our national tragedy, the doctrine of individual immortality
found relatively slight lodgment among us." 4
Perhaps the clearest indication of his personal feeling
regarding immortality appears in the same address, where
he incorporates a paragraph from Ahad Ha'am which he
considers beautifully put. Ahad Ha'am wrote:
Judaism did not turn heavenward and create in Heaven an eternal
'
11 DE HAAS, Louis D. BRANDFIS, A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 157 (1929).
112 CURsE OF BIGESS 224 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).113 BUSIxEss-A PROFESSION 38 (new ed. 1933).
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habitation of souls. It found "eternal life" on earth by strengthening
the social feeling of the individual; by making him regard himself
not as an isolated being with an existence bounded by birth and
death, but as part of a larger whole, as a limb of the social body.
This conception shifts the center of gravity not from the flesh to the
spirit, but from the individual to the community; and concurrently
with this shifting, the problem of life becomes a problem not of the
individual, but of social life. I live for the sake of the perpetuation
and happiness of the community of which I am a member; I die to
make room for new individuals who will mould the community afresh
and not allow it to stagnate and remain forever in one position.
Where the individual thus values the community as his own life and
strives after its happiness as though it were his individual well-being,
he finds satisfaction and no longer feels so keenly the bitterness of
'his individual existence, because he sees the end for which he lives
and suffers.
To this Justice Brandeis adds the comment, "Is not that the
very essence of the truly triumphant twentieth-century
philosophy?" 115
The tendency to look to the future in this temporal
world, rather than in another, and to work toward the im-
mortality of the race by procreation here rather than through
the resurrection of the body after this life, is so characteristic
of the Jewish thought about us that it is not surprising that
Jewish thinkers from Marx and Durkheim to S. Alexander
and Laski should emphasize the importance of the masses,
the solidarity, the collectivity, the brotherhood, in the tem-
poral evolution of godliness and social justice even to the
point of minimizing the significance of the individual. What
is astonishing is the fact that an American judge like Mr.
Justice Holmes could have been influenced to advocate the
sacrifice of the individual to social interests "o to an extent
greater than the Jewish Justice Brandeis with his American
training, was willing to go. For Mr. Justice Brandeis there
was always present an ethical factor which for Mr. Justice
Holmes was irrelevant. This ethical factor took the place
11 5 LIn, BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERIcAN IDEAL 323
(1936); DE HAAS, Louis D. BRANDEIS, A BIOGRAPHICAL SicETcH 196 (1929).
116 HOLmES, COmMON LAW 108 (1881); ROONEY, LAWLESSNESS, LAW AND
SANCTION 119 (1937).
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for Justice Brandeis of the theological virtue of hope, for
he says,
The sole bulwark against demoralization is to develop in each new
generation of Jews in America the sense of "noblesse oblige." That
spirit can be developed in those who regard their race as destined
to live, and to live with a bright future.1 7
The stress Mr. Justice Brandeis puts upon morals and
ethics in his effort to restQre respect for the law is almost
unique among modern jurists. Most theorists about the law
since Hobbes and Bentham have endeavored to separate
morals from law. Even Justice Cardozo talks not about
morals but about the mores of the community which the
judge intuitively reflects in enunciating law." 8 With Mr.
Justice Brandeis, however, the notion of ethics remains a
criterion outside the law by which the goodness of the law
is measured. His concept of ethics is not clearly set forth
but his confidence in the existence of morality is as certain
as is his belief in law. Apparently his idea of morals is
closely associated with his feeling for brotherhood, democ-
racy, and the future of the race, for he says,
Precisely because I believe in this future in which material comfort
is to be comparatively easy of attainment, I also believe that the race
must steadily insist upon preserving its moral vigor unweakened.119
Elsewhere he refers to "this great ethical movement for real
brotherhood of men" when speaking about "the awakened
social sense of the community, with its longing for a truer
democracy." 120 He notes that "there is also a law of ethics
that man shall not advance his own interests by exploiting
his weaker fellows or through casting burdens upon the com-
munity." 121 And he relates the sacrifices required by the
moral law for democracy when he says,
But democracy in any sphere is a serious undertaking. It substitutes
self-restraint for external restraint. It is more difficult to maintain
117 THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 229 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
'1s CAIozo, GROWTH OF LAW 52-3 (1924) ; Rooney, Mr. Justice Cardozo's
Relaivism, 19 NEw ScHoLAsTIcism 14 (1945).119 THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 46 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).120 THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WoRLD 143 (Lief ed. 1941).
121 THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 56 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
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than to achieve. It demands continuous sacrifice by the individual
and more exigent obedience to the moral law than any other form
of government. Success in any democratic undertaking must proceed
from the individual. It is possible only where the process of per-
fecting the individual is pursued. His development is attained mainly
in the processes of common living. Hence the industrial struggle
is essentially an affair of the Church and its imperative task.122
It is because he believes America's fundamental law
seeks to make real the brotherhood of man which has been
the Jewish fundamental law for over twenty-five hundred
years that he finds in twentieth century America the demand
for social justice which is similar to the Jewish striving for
effective democracy.123 With the Jews, the passion for right-
eousness was strengthened through persecution.1 2 4  "There
is something better than peace," he says, "and that is the
peace that is won by struggle." 125 Again he declares, "prog-
ress flows only from struggle." 126 Elsewhere he associates
the battle for progress with freedom and "that is the only
way we can advance." 127
Since struggle for freedom and justice is a moral duty
for Mr. Justice Brandeis, he has no sympathy with so-called
Christian resignation in the face of evil. He feels that an
awakened moral sense in the social-minded intelligentsia
combined with the awakened economic sense of organized
labor "could break down the stupid belief that business evils,
such as espionage, were inevitable ills which a Christian
should bear with resignation." 128 In his brief on the Oregon
minimum wage law he marvels at "the patience with which
widespread evils have been borne as if they were inevitable,"
and adds, "how potent the forces of conservatism that could
have prevented our learning that, like animals, men and
women must be properly fed and housed, if they are to be
222 Id. at 270-271.
123 LIFp, BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 322
(1936); DE HAAS, Louis D. BRANDEIS, A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 161 (1929).124 THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 228 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
12 5 THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN Woatn 212 (Lief ed. 1941).
226 THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WORLD 179 (Lief ed. 1941) ; THE
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 387 (Lief coil. 1930).
127 THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 402 (Lief
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useful workers and survive." 129 Nearly twenty years later
in his dissenting opinion in Liggett v. Lee 130 he speaks of
"the evils attendant upon the free and unrestricted use of
the corporate mechanism, as if these evils were the inescap-
able price of civilized life and, hence, to be borne with resig-
nation." Instead of being resigned to evils, he advocates
fighting them and with weapons other than prayers:
If the Survey expects to break down the stupid belief that irregu-
larity is inevitable-one of the ills which a Christian should bear
with resignation-it will have to fight with weapons other than the
paternosters of princes and politicians .... 131
The reason that he urges the invention of social weapons
which will effectively correct economic injustices is because
he recognizes the deadening effect of the power and control
exercised by business monopolies upon life. "Those who con-
trol our trusts," he says, "do not want the bother of develop-
ing anything new." 132 Instead they seek to control essential
raw material in order to prevent business rivals' access to
it. 133 The steel trust for example, "by buying up existing
plants and particularly ore supplies at fabulous prices, and
by controlling strategic transportation systems" eliminated
competitors. Such trusts obtain huge profits not through
efficiency in production and distribution but through control
of the market, a control which amounts to "the exercise by
a small body of men of the sovereign taxing power." 234
Through size alone great corporations have brought "such
concentration of economic power that so-called private cor-
porations are sometimes able to dominate the state." "Il The
evil that results is two-fold. In the first place wide diffusion
of stock ownership prevents the thousands of stock-holders
from exercising the supervision for which they are morally
responsible over the few men who direct corporate ac-
tivities.186 On the other hand, the endeavor by combinations
129 THE BRANDEIS GuIDE To THE MODERN WoRLD 288 (Lief ed. 1941).
130288 U. S. 517, 541, 77 L. ed. 929, 940 (1933) ; THE BRANDEIS Guwa To
THE MODERN WORLD 288 (Lid! ed. 1941).
23, Id. at 83.
13 2 THE CuRSE oF BIGNESS 118 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
1M3 Id. at 124.
134 Id. at 109.
135 Id. at 169.
136 Ibid.
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of superior power to close the field of competition or to re-
strict individual effort, takes "away from the people that
protection which comes from the incentive in the individual
to create." 137 From both viewpoints he points out that
"neither our intelligence nor our characters can long
stand the strain of unrestricted power." 138 Because he feels
that "unlicensed liberty leads necessarily to despotism or
oligarchy," Mr. Justice Brandeis believes that "those who
are stronger must to some extent be curbed." 139
To offset the tendency toward corporate despotism and
its consequent demoralizing effect upon democracy, Mr. Jus-
tice Brandeis relies upon the power of the state. "The power
of the state," he observes, "exists equally whether the end
sought to be attained is the promotion of health, safety, or
morals, or is the prevention of fraud or the prevention of
general demoralization." 140 Primarily the power of the state
to regulate is a legislative power, although legislation may
be made effective through administrative agencies or tri-
bunals. The means used should be preventive as far as pos-
sible rather than punitive. 141 In devising techniques through
which administrative tribunals may enforce limitations and
rules prescribed by the legislatures Mr. Justice Brandeis is
particularly interested in novel inventions as well as in the
use of well-established means like the taxing power. In the
institution of the Federal Trade Commission, with which he
had much to do, he was most concerned with the device
known as "cease and desist orders" 142 and he pointed out
that the procedure "is a strictly preventive measure taken in
the interest of the general public ... it is brought to prevent
... not the commission of acts of unfair competition but the
pursuit of unfair methods .... ,, 143 He felt that by thorough
137 THE CURsE OF BIGNESS 118 (Fraenkel ed. 1934); THE BRANDEIS GUIDE
TO THE MODERN WoRLD 310 (Lief ed. 1941).
138 BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 17 (new ed. 1932).
139 THE CUmsE OF BIGNESS 114 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
140 THE SOCIAL AND EdONOMIC VIEWS OF M. JusrcE BRANDEIs 4 (Lief
coll. 1930).
141 THE BRANDEIS GuIDE TO THE MODERN WORLD 242 (Lief ed. 1941).
242 LIEF, BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 291
(1936).
143 THE SOCIAL AND ECNovmIc VIEws OF MR. JusTcE BRANDEIS 76 (Lief
coiL 1930).
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fact-finding and bringing to the attention of the public the
knowledge of unfair business methods commonly used, much
could be accomplished. 144 He told Congress that it was his
belief "that by the adoption of a proper system of account-
ing, supplemented by proper publicity, we shall reduce to a
great extent, the number of breaches of law." 14r
Another device which interested him a great deal was
the certificate of public convenience which gave rise to the
famous Ice case.1 46  The tax power, too, he felt should be
used for the encouragement or discouragement of competi-
tion, 1 47 or anti-social evils attributable to bigness. 48  But in
advocating legislative experimentation with such devices he
did not intend to displace the courts; he wished, on the con-
trary, "to make them efficient instruments of justice." 149
He thought that efficient judicial machinery would be "even
more potent as a deterrent than as a cure," 150 while on the
other hand, inefficient judicial machinery resulting in a fail-
ure of justice brought all law into disrepute.' 5 ' Since such
failure was not inherent in the judicial process, he believed,
but "due wholly to a surprising lack of effective legal methods
and machinery" ' 5 2 he felt that better methods would insure
greater respect for law.
With regard to judicial legislation he said, "When a
court decides a case upon grounds of public policy, the judges
become in effect legislators." 153 In amplification of this view
he explained at another time,
The application of an existing principle to a new state of facts is not
judicial legislation. To call it such is to assert that the existing body
of law consists practically of the statutes and decided cases, and to
deny that the principles (of which these cases are ordinarily said to
be evidence) exist at all. It is not the application of an existing prin-
144 THE CuRsE OF BIGNEss 141 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
'145 THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WoRLD 242 (Lief ed. 1941).
46 THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 155 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
147 THE BeRNDiEs GumE TO THE MODERN WoiL 33 (Lief ed. 1941).
148 Id. at 20.
149 THE CuRsE OF BIGNESS 323 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
150 Id. at 132.
15, Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 THE SOCIAL. AND EcoxomIc THEORIES OF MP_ JusEicE BRANDEis 403
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ciple to new cases, but the introduction of a new principle which is
properly called judicial legislation.154
From this explanation it would seem clear that his own par-
ticular device of enlarging the scope of judicial notice to in-
clude greater quantities of facts, the device which has be-
come famous as the Brandeis Brief, is not to be considered
as judicial legislation. As one of his biographers writes:
"The touch of the artist is most apparent in Mr. Justice
Brandeis' creative use of judicial notice; the judgment of the
court is predicated not only upon the law but also upon the
matter to which it relates-the constitutionality of a statute
depends upon its reasonableness .... ,, 155 Of this same de-
vice another biographer recalls that "Cardozo regarded
Brandeis as standing 'with the few great judges of his
country and the world,' the originator of a method of solving
constitutional law problems 'which, if followed, would keep
the law responsive to changing human needs; in his work on
the bench he has shown this method in action.' " "I
Whether the agency of the state be judicial, adminis-
trative, or legislative, its functioning as an instrumentality
of law will become increasingly important, he felt, in secur-
ing freedom. This implies the continued growth of govern-
mental control. But legal control as Justice Brandeis visual-
izes it is not control over persons but rather control for the
protection of human beings and their greater liberty.
"I can see," he says, "that the tendency is steadily toward govern-
mental control. The government must keep order not only physi-
cally but socially. In old times the law was meant to protect each
citizen from oppression from physical force. But we have passed
... to oppression in other ways. And the law must still protect a
man from things that rob him of his freedom, whether the oppressing
force be physical or of a subtler kind." 157
Unlike Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Harold Laski, Jus-
tice Brandeis did not rely upon experts, even in administra-
tive tribunals, to make the legal machine effective. On the
2 54 THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 304 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
255 MR. JusricE BRANDEIS 179-180 (Frankfurter ed. 1932).
156 LmF, BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 452
(1936).
157 BUSINESs-A PROFESSION Ilii (new ed. 1933).
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contrary he had learned to distrust experts and to put more
faith in democratic methods. "I began to see," he says, "that
many things sanctioned by expert opinion and denounced by
popular opinion were wrong." 11s But he did go along part
way with Frankfurter, one of his biographers notes, on the
value of a "well-equipped group who could give their time
to threshing out legislative proposals and promoting those
that appeared to be sound." IfY In other words, while he did
not approve of an oligarchy of any sort even of brains, he did
recognize the need of intellectual leadership in a democracy
comprised of rational beings, providing that the people actu-
ally accepted it. "I agree fully," he says, "that we must have
individuals to be leaders, not groups or the decision of every
important question by votes; democracy is in no sense in-
consistent with individual leadership; only it must be lead-
ership by consent and the consent must be actual." 100
Instead of emphasizing governmental controls, no mat-
ter how carefully planned, he would minimize the incidence
of government to the greatest degree possible. "The ideal,"
with Justice Brandeis, "is for the people to have as little need
of government and the law as possible; we need government
to give help, but it should be restricted to certain limits." 11
Upon a question of morality, however, where liberty is at
stake, there is no room for compromise---"industrial liberty,
like civil liberty, must rest upon the solid foundation of
law." 162
Uppermost in all Justice Brandeis' thinking about de-
mocracy is his reliance upon the rule of law. He is concerned
lest the law fall into disrespect and he devotes his best
thought to strengthening confidence in it. Repeatedly he
points out that this is a government of laws and not of
men,'6 3 and that the Jewish conception of law is embodied
in the American Constitution, with its proclamation of a
158 THE CuasE oF BIGNESS 41 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
59 LIEF, BRANDEIS, THF PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AmERUCAN IDEAL 263
(1936).16 0 THE BRANDEIS Gum TO THE MODERN WORLD 71 (Lief ed. 1941).
16 1 Id. at 35.
262 BuSINEss-A PROFESSION 26 (new ed. 1933).
263Id. at 98.
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government of laws. 6" Furthermore, he looks to the law not
as a substitute for but as a reenforcement of education.
"If we were all wise," he observes, "we would not need any law.
We would not need any criminal law, surely, because we know that
the wages of sin is death. However, we need law as an aid to wisdom.
If we could rely wholly upon education there would be little need of
laws, because much legislation is designed merely to make people do
that which is for their best interests." 16r
In summary, Justice Brandeis holds that through the
rule of law, freedom and justice are secured. Through jus-
tice, peace will prevail, for "peace can exist only in a world
where justice and good-will reign." 166 And with the Jewish
struggle for righteousness through law, Justice Brandeis
associates the Jewish longing for truth.16 7 Truth, knowl-
edge, facts, law, justice, all these goals of human living are
combined by Justice Brandeis in one sentence: "Justice can
be attained only by careful regard for fundamental facts,
since justice is but truth in action." 168
Notwithstanding Justice Brandeis' protests that he sub-
scribes to no philosophical system, it is obvious that his think-
ing follows the lines of a fundamental pattern. He continu-
ally rethinks conclusions which had been widely accepted
until his time, but his thinking is done exclusively within
the boundaries prescribed by the common law. To that law
he undertook to make a distinctive contribution. An ap-
praisal of his achievement as measured by the philosophical
realism basic to the common law system is prerequisite to
an estimate of his significance in the history of jurisprudence.
Primary to his thought is his insistence on facts. Indeed
it may be said that facts are for Justice Brandeis the sources
of the law. In this respect facts take the place for him that
nature held for Bracton and the founders of the common
law. To some extent, facts and nature are interchangeable,
16 4 DE HAAs, Louis D. BRANDEIS, A BIOGRAPHICAL SxETcH 179 (1929).
265 THE BRANlSas GUIDE TO THE MODERN WORLD 166 (Lief ed. 1941).
'
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since facts are determinations of nature and are based upon
it. Both are objectively viewed by the mind which observes
them. A distinction, however, exists between them insofar
as nature exists as created by its Author quite independently
of whether any human mind observes it or not. Facts, on
the other hand, while based upon nature, and therefore found
objectively outside mind, nevertheless are particular aspects
of nature which have significance for human thought, largely
because of the human element present in their observance.
In an earlier day, when law was understood to comprise
divine and eternal law as well as positive law, nature and
natural law were customarily used to describe the order of
the universe which man recognized as existing about him,
whether or not he understood its functioning. The employ-
ment of the word "facts" as a substitute for "nature" or
"natural law" accords more closely with modern agnosticism,
which is unconcerned with the spiritual. From the stand-
point of legal philosophy, the choice of "facts" in preference
to "nature," makes little difference, since either "facts" or
"nature," objectively observed, constitute the foundations of
philosophical realism. Justice Brandeis, by relentlessly in-
sisting on the search for facts, based his jurisprudence on the
realism basic to the traditional common law.
In the Brandeis system there are, however, two elements
of philosophical realism which were glossed over or ignored.
The first is the nature of realism itself, for realism, precisely
because it is realism, recognizes its limitations. Since truth
in the mind and truth in nature are not the same, but rather
are related by a correspondence or conformity of the former
to the latter, the res or thing which exists in the mind is not
the thing itself as it exists in nature but an idea of that thing
formed by the mind which observes it. In other words, the
table-wood, shape, and all-upon which I am writing does
not physically take up time and space in my mind, but rather
a likeness of it exists in my mind, similar to a snapshot but
generalized to indicate not one particular table but a com-
parison of tables with each other and with chairs and other
objects. To the extent that the human mind is involved, the
fact or aspect of nature being observed is modified by the
natural limitations of the human mind in comprehending
19471
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the object fully. Philosophical realism does not ignore this
human factor but reckons with it, differing from other philo-
sophical systems in measuring mind by nature, instead of
nature by mind. Justice Brandeis, though master of the
law of evidence, in which demonstrations of the inaccuracies
of the observing mind occur frequently, fails to consider the
mental element in observing facts, which a fully rounded
out philosophical realism would have given him.
A second factor which differentiates the legal realism
of Justice Brandeis' concern for facts from the philosophical
realism of what Pollock and Maitland referred to as "the
golden age of the common law," 1(1 is the subjective element
in the selection of facts. Obviously the human mind cannot
cope with an unending sequence of facts, if those facts are
to yield significance for the mind. There must be some
organization of facts on the basis of relationship, and there-
fore a selection of some facts to the exclusion of others from
consideration on a given subject or at a certain time, if they
are to have any meaning. Philosophical realism recognizes
that whenever choice or selection comes into play, a sub-
jective element enters which again modifies comprehension
-f nature in the human mind. Mr. Justice Brandeis never
seemed to be quite conscious of this subjective factor in fact-
finding, but on the contrary betrayed what almost amounted
to naivft6 in assuming that the facts which had significance
for him were the only possible facts available and that even
were those facts admittedly of the utmost importance, that
they would have the same significance for others as they had
for him. It was almost as if, in the manner of Gertrude
Stein, he had said, "a fact is a fact is a fact," depending upon
repetition to make it more so.
Mr. Justice Brandeis' neglect of the mental element with
respect to the sources of law did not, however, carry over
into that aspect of his jurisprudence which may be called the
forms of law. On the contrary, so convinced was he of the
capacity and the duty of human reason to regulate and con-
trol the facts of life in accordance with human needs, once
they are ascertained, that his philosophy of law could as
269 1 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE EDWARD I 112 (1895).
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properly be called rationalistic or intellectualistic as real-
istic. He had confidence in the human mind, not only in his
own, but also in the minds of men in general, to face the
problems of life and master them. Here again, he was un-
concerned with the supernatural and the functioning of a
divine intellect which the human mind observes in operation
and adumbrates, and in which it may participate in giving
order to a part of the universe. He accepted unquestioningly
the universe as he found it, and within its limitations and
conditions he undertook to use his mental powers to the full-
est in making it so far as possible a better place to live. His
respect for the integrity of his own mind was the foundation
of his respect for the minds of others. So high was his re-
gard for intellectual ability that he appears to have over-
looked the physical and emotional drives which condition
mental capacities in men generally. The basis of his confi-
dence in democracy is to be found in his reliance on the abil-
ity of human beings to think. For both democracy and law,
his abiding belief in the appeal to reason in other men was
the basis of his realism.
It is in the ftunctioning of law and its efficient operation
that the Brandeis contribution to jurisprudence discloses its
novelty. Justice Brandeis thought of law as an invention,
device, or instrument, humanly conceived and humanly ap-
plied to effectuate justice. Until well along in the nineteenth
century, law had been considered declaratory of right, and
its rules were said to be found, not made. To Jeremy
Bentham is ascribed the change in concept.170 By his ac-
ceptance of the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes to the point
of equating law with force, and by his adoption of philo-
sophical positivism in his efforts to codify the positive law
of England, Bentham so confused the usages of the word
"qaw," that the way to misunderstanding has been made
easier than the road to clarity. It is now common to hear it
said that the judges make the law, or, that the law is what
1
7 0 CAPM, CONCERNING ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8 (1941); MR JusTicz
BRANDEIS 16 (Frankfurter ed. 1932); RooNEY, LAWLESSNESS, LAW AND
SANCrION 90-103 (1937) (criticism of Bentham).
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the judges say it is. 17 1 Two centuries and more before
Bentham wrote, a controversy arose in England regarding
the power of Parliament to make new law.172  Before the
sixteenth century, statutes, like judicial decisions, were held
to be declaratory of law only. With the growth of the doc-
trine of the "divine right of kings" in place of the Bractonian
view that "the king is under God and the Law," an arbitrari-
ness developed in the executive which required nothing less
than a revolutionary war to bring it under control. In mod-
ern times, a tendency toward the development of a theory
of the "divine right of the judges" 173 has given rise to much
criticism of courts and their operation. It was the Brandeis
conception of the functioning of law that judges could com-
mand respect proportionate to their adaptation of legal rules
to the changing conditions of modern life. The application
of his theory has at times been undertaken on a philosophical
foundation of materialistic-positivism, after Bentham, or of
idealistic-absolutism, after Hegel, instead of realism, with
rather disastrous results. Worked out upon a realistic basis,
in accordance with Justice Brandeis' own understanding of
the common law, the reasonableness of his instrumentalist
approach requires a new examination of the age-old doctrine
that law is found, not made.
When Mr. Justice Brandeis based his theory on facts as
the source of law, and looked to mind to impart to those facts
some sort of legal form, he was in effect taking nature as he
found it, not creating an idealistic situation which had no
foundation in reality. He did not attempt to define that
nature nor to speculate upon its order or laws beyond the
line which separates the scientific from the metaphysical
realm of thought. For the most part, he ignored the meta-
physical in his thinking about facts, but he accepted it, at
least implicitly, and did not deny its reality as many of his
followers have done. In other words, although he did not
accept the natural law, as such, nor even profess to be con-
171MASON, BRANDEIS AND THE MODERN STATE 1 (1933); MR. JUSTICE
BRANDEIS v (Frankfurter ed. 1932).
172A DIscouRsE UPON THE EXPOSITION AND UNDERSTANDING OF STATUTES
Introduction (Thorne ed. 1942).
173 R ONEY, LAWLESSNESS, LAW AND SANCTION 119 (1937).
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cerned about it, much less to understand it, nevertheless by
his unceasing search for facts and his acceptance of the
capacity of human reason, conditioned by that nature of
which it is a part, to give some order to nature-that is, to
facts observed from nature-Justice Brandeis by implication
agreed to a large extent with the natural law theorists, who,
because they observe order or law in nature, declare law is
found, not made by man.
To say that law is found in nature, or that natural law
exists independent of anyone's mind, does not require a de-
nial that a human mind, entrusted officially with jurisdic-
tion, can formulate or "make" rules applicable to other
human beings which will modify in some respect the under-
standing of the relation of man to nature. As long as the
rule is a modification only and not an attempt to change or
deny the unchangeable relation between human beings and
that nature which surrounds them, is other than they, and
yet in which they participate and form a part, the rule is not
only proper to man's capacities but may be demanded of him
as a rational being by his environment. To fail to utilize
his reason in meeting the challenge nature offers is as repre-
hensible as the attempt to defy nature by going contrary to
its precepts. No natural law jurist, no philosophical realist,
would think of the power of the human mind as prohibited
by his belief in the natural law, from formulating legal rules,
some of which may derive their force from nature. On the
contrary, it is the philosophical realist who acknowledges the
importance of nature in the life of the human mind, who
applies his intellectual powers most rationally in bettering
as far as possible the conditions of human living. Neither
the materialist who considers mind as a part of matter, nor
the idealist who spins out day-dreams unsupported by mat-
ter, both of whom rely upon physical force to make their
dreams effective, have the rational appeal of the realist who
relies upon the reasonableness of his fellows to accept and
apply his carefully thought out conclusions. Indeed it is
the realist who holds that judgments are creative--not that
they "make" truth which had no previous existence in the
universe, but rather that they give a new formulation, under-
standable to the human mind, of a relationship already ex-
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isting between mind and matter, but not before discerned
and tested by observation of nature.
Much of the confusion that persists about the unchange-
ableness of the natural law and the changing formulas of
legal rules necessitated by modifications in environment is
due to an equivocal use of the word law. In one sense, all
law is law to the extent that it requires obedience from all
subject to its jurisdiction. There is, however, no legal sys-
tem which does not distinguish between laws of greater and
lesser importance. The very names by which laws are known,
such as treaties, constitutions, statutes, decrees, ordinances,
regulations, and so on, indicate some of these distinctions.
The differences in the applicable sanctions, such as war,
prison, jail, reformatory, fine, damages, injunction, revoca-
tion, mandamus, and so forth, are similar evidences. The
tendency of the human mind to generalize the various forms
in an effort to penetrate to the substance does not justify,
however, the confusion of forms and substance in unreal ab-
stractions as the positivists and absolutists are both accus-
tomed to do. Because the realist derives his generalizations
from particular aspects of nature and measures those gen-
eralizations by testing them back to nature, he is continu-
ally making distinctions in his concepts on the basis of
individual differences. Since he habitually distinguishes be-
tween aspects of nature, he is not likely to confuse aspect
and nature. In the same way the natural law jurist who
bases his theory on philosophical realism, is not likely to con-
fuse nature or natural law, which is unchanging in its rela-
tionship to mind, with those formulations of legal rules, or
of judgments, which must necessarily change with man's
greater knowledge of nature. In other words, for the realists,
natural law is found, not made, but human law, whether
positive or customary, is formulated--"made," if you will-
by the creative judgments of the human mind. Another way
of putting it, is that natural law, which pertains to the es-
sence of the order of the universe of which man is a part, is
unchanging in its relationship to man, although his knowl-
edge of it changes as he becomes better informed of its na-
ture, while human law, which is comprised of human formu-
lations of the natural law as well as of formulations of the
[ VOL. 22
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essentially indifferent, can and does change in accordance
with the determinations and conclusions of human choices
and judgments.
Those legal rules which are essentially indifferent with
respect to the natural law, and are often referred to as the
morally indifferent, 174 are from the quantitive standpoint
much more frequently encountered in human experience than
are formulations of the natural law. This is largely due to
the fact that man, because he is himself part of nature, and
because he is also rational, is normally accustomed to go
along with nature, and not likely to defy it. He has within
his own person, if he is healthy, a faculty which intuitively
indicates conformity of his action with natural law, for natu-
ral law is promulgated or made known to him essentially
through his own nature's participation in the universal order.
With respect to the rules which are morally indifferent, how-
ever, positive promulgation is necessary in order that he may
be bound to observe them. It is the necessity of promulgat-
ing each specific rule for each person to whom it is applicable
that gives rise to the multiplicity of laws found in the law
books. The more frequently these laws are amended, re-
pealed, or revoked, the greater the uncertainty of what con-
stitutes existing law. Uncertainty in law is undesirable for
many reasons, but as long as it concerns only the morally
indifferent and does not affect the essence of the natural law,
no objection is raised from the standpoint of philosophical
realism. To stand by the principles may be suggested by
prudence, but insofar as the natural law is not invoked and
the principles have been derived from the morally indiffer-
ent, there is no compulsion to observe them on the ground
of unchangeableness of law alone.
A relevant illustration of the difference between declara-
tory law and "law" that is "made" is to be found in the Papal
Encyclical Letters on labor. In Reruim Novarm, the En-
cyclical "On the Condition of the Working Classes," issued
by Pope Leo XIII in 1891, there is an insistence on the natu-
174 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, I, II SU mMA THEOLOGICA q. 100, a. 11, II, II, at
q. 60, a. 5, etc., as cited in ROONEY, LAWLESSNESS, LAW AND SANCrION 24,
n. 13-16 (1937).
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ral right to private property essential to all men, laborers
as well as capitalists. In the Encyclical, Quadragesimo
Anno, issued by Pope Pius XI in 1931, and known as "Forty
Years After," there is a direction to utilize the power of the
state if necessary in order to redistribute property so that
all men, laborers as well as capitalists, may have a proper
share of wealth in accordance with their natural right.1 75
Monsignor John A. Ryan noted the difference in the two
documents 176 without however indicating the equivocal
usage of the word law or explaining that the ground for the
distinction between them is to be found in philosophical
realism. Perhaps it should be added here that the power of
the state as used in the Encyclical "Forty Years After"
means that as a last resort, the force of law as authorized
by a legitimate government should be invoked with pen-
alties, if needed to secure greater justice. This should not
be understood as equating law with force. On the contrary,
the qualifying phrase "if necessary" is added in order to
imply that law functions properly as a direction or guidance
to reasonable men in order to aid them in doing what is right.
This direction failing for one reason or another in its appeal
to reason, may ultimately find support through legitimately
applied force, force being not a first but a last resort for law.
Since the doctrine of these Encyclical Letters is concerned
with the proper distribution of private property, another
point should be made here about the appeal to reason, which
is the primary purpose of law. Because legal rules are the
means used to direct people with respect to the distribution
of their property, it has become common to say that law
regulates property. Economists like Richard Ely and John
R. Commons have written important books upon Property
and Contraot, 77 and upon The Lega Foundations of (api-
talisn1,Y 8  With the Marxists, so closely has law become
identified with property, that their revolt against private
175 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, II, II SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 49, a. 1; ARISTomE,
Nic ETHICS lib. I, lect. 2, and other citations quoted in ROONEY, LAWLESSNESS,
LAW AND SANcriON 49 (1937).
176Ryan, The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, ESSAYS ON
THo ism 239-260 (Brennan ed. 1942).
177 (1914).
178 (1924).
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property holding implies the abolition of law. Again, as in
the equating of law with force, the equating of law with prop-
erty is due to an equivocal usage of the word law and to a
failure to remember that law is primarily not reason in it-
self but an appeal to reason in human beings artfully de-
signed to direct and guide them to act as closely as possible
in conformity with the order which obviously governs the
universe of which they are a part. A careful reading of the
Encyclicals discloses that a philosophical realism which in-
cludes these elements lies at the foundation of the Papal
doctrine.
Justice Brandeis is not explicit in distinguishing be-
tween law as an expression of the natural law and law as a
regulation of the morally indifferent, but in practice, by im-
plicitly recognizing the existence of nature in his continual
search for objective facts and by devoting his intellectual
efforts to the invention of legal devices directed instinctively
toward the regulation of the morally indifferent, his theory
of the functioning of law is closer to the basic realism of the
common law system than that of many of his contemporaries
and followers. It is upon the solidly grounded foundation
of concrete facts that he develops his technique of fact-
finding into an instrument with which to modify prevailing
legal rules. In designing his instrument he carefully works
within established institutions. He never denies such natu-
ral law doctrines as the right to hold private property, but
on the contrary undertakes to make the law more just in its
directions regarding the distribution of property. His ap-
peal is seldom to force, save as an ultimate measure, but is
on the contrary addressed most frequently to reason in de-
vices like "cease and desist orders." Unlike so many of the
"economic planners" who have attempted to imitate his suc-
cess without penetrating to the roots of his strength, he re-
frained from the watch-words of the modern plague of
"sanctionists"---"you do as I say, or else-." Instead he
invented a legal instrument which effected a revolution in
the administration of law without ignoring or subverting the
facts which disclose the relation of man and nature. As
Charles P. Curtis would explain it, Justice Brandeis was
1947]
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concerned with the expansion or the extension of the coverage
of legal rules, rather than with their relation.1 9
In acknowledging that Justice Brandeis' chief contribu-
tion to modern jurisprudence lies in the instrumentalist char-
acter of his use of the fact-finding technique as applied in
the administration of legal rules, a comparison with the con-
cept distinctive with John Dewey of logic as an instrument
of inquiry 180 is to be anticipated. Although the Dewey sys-
tem was influenced in its origins by the pragmatism of
William James, and Justice Brandeis was aware of the
Holmes-James debates, there is nowhere to be found in the
Brandeis writings any indication that the Brandeis notion
of law as instrument was influenced in any way by the Dewey
notion of logic as instrument. It is not Justice Brandeis but
the students of his methods, who usually are students of the
Dewey writings also, who tend to equate the two. The fact
is, however, that the basic realism of Brandeis necessarily
implies the rejection of the idealism of Dewey, since realistic
logic derives its first principles of identity and contradiction
from the observation of existent nature, whereas the Dewey
theory of logic is derived from idealistic speculations about
the non-existent or the possible. It is the Brandeis misfor-
tune to have had his work interpreted less by philosophical
realists than by abstractionists who, by reading Dewey pre-
conceptions into their interpretations of his writings, confuse
instead of distinguish the two theories.
The sanction of law in the Brandeis system has already
been mentioned as primarily an appeal to reason and closely
allied to education, with which he was greatly concerned.
His belief that if you educate people in better ways of doing
things you will seldom need to punish them for wrong-doing
is so much closer to the foundations of the common law than
the Holmes 181 or even the Cardozo theory 182 of sanction,
that it is only necessary to set them out side by. side to see
'179 CUTmIs, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 175 (1947).
180 Rooney, Law and the New Logic 16, PRoc. Am. CATH. PHILos. Ass'N 197,
199 (1940).
181 ROONEY, LAWLESSNESS, LAW AND SANCTION 114-136 (1937).
182 Rooney, Mr. Justice Cardozo's Relatizdsm, 19 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 17
(1945).
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the difference. Holmes followed Bentham 183 in making the
rule and the punishment correlative, by reading precepts as
if they said, "either do this, or, be punished," and therefore
he considered penalties as the equivalence of law. By it men
are reduced to the level of animals by reliance on force as the
foundation of satisfactory behavior. Brandeis, on the con-
trary, reads precepts as if they were expressed in the condi-
tional form: "if you do (not do) this, you may be punished."
This, instead of equating law with force, appeals above all to
reason, and thereby implicitly distinguishes man from ani-
mals and less valuable forms of life. It derives neither from
materialism nor absolutistic idealism, but is on the contrary
essentially a realistic concept of legal sanction.
In the Brandeis system of jurisprudence, the final
purpose, end, or goal for law is liberty. Justice is an inter-
mediate goal toward which much profound thought is di-
rected, but at times justice itself appears to be treated less
as end than as means in achieving personal freedom. This
treatment of justice is doubtless due to Justice Brandeis'
disregard of any idea of justice as a supernatural virtue and
his concentration on improving living conditions on this
earth. For him, the just is usually the fair or the propor-
tionate, ascertained as rationally as possible. Given a proper
amount of property, talent, and education, and such things
as are essential to human personality, a man is free to de-
velop responsibility in accordance with his dignity as a man,
in the Brandeis view. This thought is carried further to
where he thinks that it is the function of law to use the power
of the state if necessary to alleviate oppression in any form
which would tend to limit man's freedom in developing his
powers to the fullest. Human progress, then, may be said
to consist in the advancement of liberty in the Brandeis
theory.
If the question be asked, "liberty from what?" the
Brandeis answer comes readily enough: "'liberty from op-
pression, arbitrariness, tyranny"; but if the question is,
"liberty for what?" the answer is less definite. Responsi-
bility, self-development, self-government, are partial answers,
183 ROONEY, LAWLESSNESS, LAW AND SANCTION 90-103 (1937).
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accompanied by many references to the moral and the ethical,
but the standard or criterion by which progress, justice, or
freedom may be judged is obscure. Justice Brandeis appar-
ently took for granted the existence of a higher law upon
which a criterion of justice and morals could be based, but
he omitted any formulation of his implicit assumption. His
instinctive awareness of this lack is suggested by the readi-
ness with which he welcomed the doctrine of Achad Ha'am
concerning the Jewish disbelief 184 in personal immortality.
Following his acceptance of that doctrine, which substituted
better living for the group, the race, the brotherhood, on
earth, in place of the Christian dogma of the redemption, he
added to his goal of liberty the concept of fraternity. The
secularist, if not masonic, tendency of his thinking about the
end of law is suggested by his repetition of the Mazzini for-
mula of purpose in life-to "add one's stone to the pyramid
of history." 185 His admiration for Mazzini, Garibaldi, and
Cavour, inherited from his ancestors and their friends among
the "liberals of '48," 186 however, never induced him to adopt
the egalitarian standard established through force by the
levellers of the French Revolution, in preference to the rea-
soned arguments for liberty which characterized the Ameri-
can Revolutionists. For Justice Brandeis, the call was not
"liberty, fraternity, equality," but 'liberty, fraternity, honor,
and justice," with equality of opportunity for all."8 7
The practical effect of the Brandeis theory of jurispru-
dence was an ardent advocacy of democracy. His concept of
democracy was far removed from that of the abstractionists
who think of democracy as a form of government for the
masses who are said to be given an opportunity to participate
in the decisions of the ruling oligarchy through "consensus."
With this voluntarist idea of democracy, in which formal
assent gives the appearance of free choice, but in reality is
based not on reason but on coercion and force or pressure,
184 Id. at 26.
'18 5 THE CuRIa OF BIGNESS 220 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
1 8 6 GOLDMARK, PIGIMS OF '48 27 (1930) ; LiEF, BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL
HISTORY OF AN AMEIuCAN IDEAL 210, 221, 226, 239, 244 (1936).
187 BusINESs-A PRo0ssION 27 (new ed. 1933); DE HAAS, Louis D.
BRANDEIS, A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 154 (1929); see THE SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC VIEws OF MR. JusricE BRANDEIS 111 (Lief coll. 1930).
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Justice Brandeis' view had nothing in common. For him
education was fundamental in order that for each person a
reasoned acceptance of rules for living in common would be
possible. Nor was he satisfied with the least common de-
nominator of free acceptance. On the contrary, he believed
that ways and means should be devised which would require
from each person the greatest contribution to community
life, intellectually and morally, of which he may be capable.
Believing that responsibility should be developed and ex-
pected in every sphere of life, he extended his concept of
democracy from politics to industry. Further than this, be-
cause he felt that law was basic to good government which in
turn he held fundamental to industrial democracy, he was
concerned that law comprehend the problems of economics in
order to receive the requisite democratic assent. Recognizing
that law is developed largely through the litigation of pri-
vate claims, he nevertheless viewed it steadily in its broader
effects on the public welfare. Continually he insisted that
advocacy for private litigants should be considered less,
rather than more important, than the public interest among
lawyers, and he emphasized the necessity of training the
ablest men as "people's counsel." 188 With Charles Henderson
he agreed that adequate legal education embraced economics
as well as politics, even going so far as to quote with ap-
proval the Henderson statement that a lawyer ignorant of
economics is an enemy of the public.18 9 For Justice Brandeis,
the appeal to reason in each human being, through which
sound law functions, can win acceptance only to the extent
that it comprehends the actual problems of human living,
and so with him law is the foundation of statesmanship in
both political and industrial democracy.
The sources of strength in the Brandeis theory lie in
its reliance on facts and mind and its understanding of the
relation between them. Facts measure mind. The expansion
of the volume of facts presented to mind is considered not
only quantitatively but also qualitatively. Although the
188 BuSINEss-A PROE1SsIoN 337 (new ed. 1933) ; TnE B1~xDEis GumE To
THE MODEMa WORLD 176 (Lief ed. 1941).
189 BusINESs--A PROmssIoN 362 (new ed. 1933); MASON, BRANDEIS AND
THE MODERN STATE 29, 30 (1933).
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physical essentials of human living are accorded the fullest
consideration, almost to the exclusion of the spiritual, there
is nevertheless implicit in the theory an appreciation of
human dignity because of its intellectual powers which dis-
closes a sense of values which is altogether sound. The ac-
ceptance of moral and ethical standards, however obscurely
formulated, are indicative of this. Through the confidence
placed in the reason of each person and his natural tendency
toward the good when given opportunity for free choice, the
theory contains the essential elements of a valid concept of
democracy.
It is interesting to note some of the paradoxes through
which the theory has been worked out. In spite of his pro-
tests that he has no philosophy, it is quite evident that Jus-
*tice Brandeis' theory is not onlyrealistic but systematically
so. Notwithstanding his professed concern for brotherhood,
group, race, and democracy, his devotion to concrete facts
rather than to abstractions, results in a philosophy of law
in which the individual is the object of protection. Although
he discusses at length the rights of labor, the effect of his
instrumentalist thinking is to strengthen small business. His
effort to limit the oppressiveness of government takes shape
in more government regulation, rather than less. Though
his goal is liberty, justice, and peace, even in the industrial
sphere, for him to live is to struggle, without ceasing.
That there are weaknesses to be found in the Brandeis
theory of law is due to philosophical errors or inadequacies.
One of the errors occurs in his statement that rights are de-
rived from society. 9 ' This assertion was made inhis mature
years, after he had been influenced somewhat by the socio-
logical emphasis on group activity. It is inconsistent with
his efforts to protect human beings from the tyranny of the
group, and marks a departure from the concrete toward the
abstract or conceptualistic view. Rights, instead of being
derived from society, or the state, are inherent in the dignity
of human beings because they are human. To adopt the
words of the Declaration of Independence, men are created
with certain inalienable rights. By attributing to society
190 BusrN ss-A PoFEssIoN 24 (new ed. 1933) ; also see p. 20, n. 87.
[ VOL.. 22
THE BRANDEIS THEORY
rather than to the Creator the power to confer those rights,
Justice Brandeis insofar as he did so, abandoned the basic
realism of the American legal system.
A second philosophical fault is his failure to take into
account the subjective element in fact-finding, through which
personal preference for one type of fact over another is pre-
requisite to their organization in any scientific manner. His
assumption that each fact has the same significance for one
man as for another is unwarranted, and to the extent that he
ignored the selective factor, his realism is philosophically in-
adequate. The result is an inordinate concern with the eco-
nomic aspects of life. Notwithstanding the attention that
he gave to education, there is a utilitarian tendency in em-
phasis which exalts the material at the expense of the
spiritual. Man needs bread to live but he cannot live by
bread alone. To ignore or minimize the spiritual is to pre-
sent a picture of. man which is not properly balanced and
therefore philosophically inadequate to that extent.
The most far-reaching philosophical error 'in the
Brandeis theory is its agnosticism, for this is the underlying
cause of the other deficiencies it displays. Justice Brandeis
apparently never denied the existence of a supreme Creator
of the universe; he merely professed to know nothing about
Him and was too much occupied with the concrete facts
which did concern him to rationalize about others equally
existent. He respected religious faith in other men and ex-
pected support from religion for his deepest convictions of
the right and the good. 9" An understanding of the super-
natural, however, always remained remote from his sphere
of interest. To fill this gap in his thinking, of which he
seemed to be subconsciously aware, he embraced the Jewish
doctrine of disbelief in personal immortality, a concept which
with other Jewish thinkers like Bergson and S. Alexander
gave rise to the philosophical theory of emergent evolu-
19 MASONo, THE BRANDEIS WAY 158 (1938) (Cardinal O'Connell); Lm,
BRAxD s, THE PERSONAL HISTORy OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 102 (1936) (Rev.
A. A. Berle); THE CURsE OF BIGNESS 271 (Fraenkel ed. 1933) (Christian
Church); THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERM WoRL 96 (Lief ed. 1941);
MAsoN, THE BRANDEIS WAY 156 (1938).
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tion.192 In proposing a hypothesis about the nature of life
in time and space, which restricts its speculations, in the
words of H. G. Wells, to "the shape of things to come" 193
on this earth, it at the same time empties the concept of
brotherhood of any reality based upon the fatherhood of
God beyond and around time and space. As in his concept
of rights in relation to society, so here again, in his concept
of the purpose of life in relation to brotherhood, Justice
Brandeis accepts idealistic hypotheses in place of his usual
attraction for realism, and weakens his philosophical system
to the extent that he does so. His agnosticism is a negative
discord in what is otherwise for the most part a harmonious
affirmation of reality.
In summary, Justice Brandeis' statement that he had
no philosophy may be accepted if that statement is under-
stood to mean that he adopted neither the materialistic phi-
losophies of force nor the subjective philosophies of abso-
lutism which have currently been postulated as desirable
foundations for jurisprudence. But if his assertion be under-
stood to deny systematic thinking about law in the philo-
sophical sense, analysis of his writings not only disproves
the statement but also discloses a philosophical foundation
based on realism which follows closely the lines upon which
the common law was built. Because his philosophy was un-
avowed, it was not fully formulated. It remained vague in
some of its most important aspects, such as its purpose or
end. In some other respects, perhaps. because of its vague-
ness and lack of formulation, it adopted, possibly inadvert-
ently, some philosophical postulates inconsistent with its
basic realism. To the extent that Justice Brandeis resolutely
rejected erratic philosophical speculations and held firmly
to the principles of the common law, his jurisprudence has
validity. The strength of the Brandeis theory is derived from
the great common law tradition, whose vitality he demon-
strated anew.
1 92 BERsON, CREATIW EvOLUTON (1911); ALEXANDER, SPACE TiME AND
Di (1920).193 (1933).
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In this attempt to evaluate the validity of the Brandeis
theory of law from the standpoint of philosophical realism,
no effort has been made to appraise the legal or social impli-
cations of his personal contribution to the common law sys-
tem. Indeed the device he invented, when utilized by men
less sound in their mastery of the common law than he to
effect changes in social policy, not only may leave much to
be desired, as is usual with imitations, but it could also be
dangerous in the results obtained. It is not unlike the dis-
covery of dynamite, which may be used to tunnel through
mountains in order to make the road to civilization more
direct, or which, in the hands of barbarians, might be used
to destroy the most noble monuments hitherto created by
human thought. For example, the use of the licensing or the
taxing power of the state can be not regUlatory but confis-
catory if employed arbitrarily or unrealistically. Potentially
the instrument, if torn out of its sound foundations and
welded upon either materialistic or idealistic hypotheses, can
give rise to a tyranny more grievous than that once thought
to be becoming encysted 194 in the common law, which it was
designed to correct. Its value for the jurisprudence of the
future depends upon the closeness of its constant relation to
the basic realism of the common law system, out of which
it was devised.
The purposive character of the Brandeis theory suggests
a similarity with the Socratic. For Brandeis as with
Socrates, knowledge not only brings power but also has vir-
tue in its potentialities for good. The Brandeis theory sug-
gests the Socratic in another way, too, in that it proceeds
along a single line of development, without becoming system-
atically rounded out in all directions. Socrates devised a
method of investigation which was historically the fore-
runner of the ampler philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. At
a later time, philosophy found in Abelard an originator of a
method which was to fructify in the richer systems of Alex-
ander of Hales and Aquinas, without whom the realism of
Bracton and the beginnings of the common law cannot be
104 M_ JusTicE B1RAm~Is 167 (Frankfurter ed. 1932).
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understood.195 For the American jurisprudence of the future,
Louis Brandeis has suggested a method which until now has
unfortunately been for the most part mistakenly appreciated
for its form instead of its substantial reality. He has opened
the way for someone more adequately trained in philosophy
but no less competent in mastery of the common law to per-
fect a jurisprudence which will underwrite a truly realistic
revolution in the work of justice-not for perpetual struggle,
but for eternal peace. The call for realism in the law is a
call for a modern Aristotle and Aquinas.
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